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Over the last decade, many central banks have adopted in￿ ation targeting as
a framework for monetary policymaking. Most, if not all, in￿ ation targeting
central banks use a measure of consumer price in￿ ation or one of its variants
as a target. The use of consumer price in￿ ation seems to be the most relevant
measure of in￿ ation if one views the ultimate goal of the monetary policy
to be the welfare of households, as this measure is the most relevant for
calculating the cost of living1.
This practice raises a question: should the central banks ignore develop-
ments in other measures of in￿ ation, such as the producer price index (PPI)?
If the target is CPI in￿ ation, this may seem a pointless question. However, it
is important for at least one reason. Increases in the prices of intermediate or
crude goods may pass through to consumers, resulting in a higher rate of con-
sumer in￿ ation. The greater is the pass through, the more PPI shocks feed
into consumer prices in the economy and cause disruption. Therefore, under
an in￿ ation targeting regime, the central banks can minimize the disruptive
e⁄ect of the PPI on consumer prices by also reacting to PPI in￿ ation.
Another question arises: do increased prices of intermediate or crude
goods imply a signi￿cant increase in in￿ ation risk at the consumer level in
reality? According to Ben Bernanke (2004), the answer is "almost certainly
not". Ben Bernanke argues that the main reason behind this is that "raw
materials costs are a small portion of total cost". A similar view has been
expressed by Jean-Claude Trichet (2004).
If we take the Bernanke view and construct an "optimal in￿ ation index"
that is an appropriately weighted average of CPI and PPI in￿ ation rates,
CPI should then receive substantial weight and the weight on PPI in￿ ation
would be small.
Recent work by Huang and Liu (2005) calls this view into question. Us-
ing a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that features
input-output connections between the stages of production, they argue that
a simple in￿ ation targeting rule under which the short-term interest rate re-
sponds to an "optimal in￿ ation index" results in a welfare level close to the
optimum only in cases where the "optimal in￿ ation index" places substantial
weight on both CPI in￿ ation and PPI in￿ ation. More speci￿cally, they ￿nd
1This view is consistent with the view taken by Woodford (2003). Woodford (2003)
stressed that the maximization of the welfare of a representative household should be the
appropriate policy objective in DSGE models.
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1that with their calibrated parameters, the target weight of PPI should be
as high as 46% in such an index. Obviously, this ￿nding stands in sharp
contrast to the view taken by Bernanke and Trichet.
However, unfortunately, in arriving at their conclusion, Huang and Liu
ignore the possibility that sectors may have di⁄erent characteristics and make
a strong assumption that the sectors are identical in all respects. For exam-
ple, they assume that the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is
the same. This assumption, however, is inconsistent with recent microevi-
dence provided by the European Central Bank￿ s In￿ ation Persistence Net-
work (IPN), which reveals that producer prices adjust more frequently than
consumer prices2. Nakamura and Steinsson￿ s (2007a) ￿ndings indicate the
same conclusion for the U.S. economy. In fact, this evidence is consistent
with what a model of input-output linkages would predict. As Blanchard
(1982) notes, "prices early in the chain of production move more and adjust
faster, prices further in the chain move less and adjust more slowly".
This paper aims to answer the question of which in￿ ation index the central
banks should target by studying the question in a model that accounts for
the asymmetries between the CPI sector and the PPI sector. To be speci￿c,
I use Huang and Liu￿ s model to examine the monetary policy implications of
alternative assumptions regarding the sectoral di⁄erences and explore how to
assign weights to di⁄erent sectors in an optimal in￿ ation index for a central
bank to target.
Two asymmetries will be the primary focus of the analysis: di⁄erences
in the degree of nominal rigidity and in the degree of competition. I ￿rst
examine the implications of di⁄erences in the degree of nominal rigidity for
the optimal monetary policy design. I present a more realistic numerical
example and calibrate the model with the empirically relevant frequencies
of price adjustment for each sector for the U.S. economy. Second, I deal
with the question of how di⁄erences in the degree of competition a⁄ect the
optimal weights that the sector receives in an optimal in￿ ation index. In a
recent paper Lombardo (2006) argues that when constructing a price index
for a central bank to target, a failure to take into account the possible di⁄er-
ences in the degree of competition between the sectors can signi￿cantly a⁄ect
policy evaluations. Unlike the degree of nominal rigidity, however, the de-
2See Dhyne, Alvarez, Bihan, Veronese, Dias, Ho⁄mann, Jonker, Lunnemann, Rumler
and Vilmunen (2005) for a summary of IPN￿ s ￿ndings on consumer prices and Vermeulen,
Dias, Dossche, Gautier, Hernando, Sabbatini and Stahl (2007) for a summary of IPN￿ s
￿ndings on producer prices.
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2gree of competition between di⁄erent sectors is an issue surrounded by great
uncertainty. First I will gauge the implications of the degree of competition
uncertainty by evaluating the extent to which policy conclusions are sensi-
tive to alternative assumptions regarding the degree of competition. I will
then investigate the design of optimal monetary policy when the central bank
faces uncertainty regarding the degree of competition in di⁄erent sectors.
The conclusions of the paper are brie￿ y summarised as follows. I ￿nd
that once the empirically relevant frequencies of price adjustment for each
sector are used to calibrate the model, the PPI in￿ ation indeed receives a
positive target weight. However, the weight is much less than in the case
where the degree of nominal rigidity between sectors is assumed to be the
same. The target weight of PPI in￿ ation is around 18%, a little less than
half of what it is under a symmetric degree of nominal rigidity3.
The results also suggest that formulating and implementing a rule based
on a belief that the degree of nominal rigidity is the same between the sectors
results in poor outcomes if the PPI sector actually adjusts more frequently
than the CPI sector. In contrast, if the central bank designs and implements
monetary policy rule based on the assumption that the degree of nominal
rigidity is relatively low in the PPI sector, this rule also performs reasonably
well if the degree of nominal rigidity turns out to be the same. This result
further strengthens the case for a rule that puts large weight on CPI in￿ ation.
I show that, holding other things constant, an increase in the degree of
competition in the PPI sector increases the optimal weight of the PPI in￿ a-
tion. However, when there is uncertainty regarding the degree of competition
between sectors, a central bank is concerned with protecting itself against er-
rors should assume a lower degree of competition in the PPI sector compared
to the CPI sector and set the target weight of the PPI in￿ ation as 12%. In
contrast, welfare losses would be large if the central bank assumes that the
degree of competition is higher in the PPI sector than the CPI sector.
Finally, I ￿nd that the strict output targeting rules perform very well in
this model and give a welfare level close to optimum. This result also is in
contrast to the ￿nding of Huang and Liu. However, as is well known, this
type of rule is not operational in the sense of Mccallum(1999), i.e., the rule
requires a measurement of the natural rate of output in the economy, which
3Note that in a case where the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is the
same, the optimal weight is 38%, not 46%, as argued by Huang and Liu. The di⁄erence
arises due to a technical error in Huang and Liu￿ s calculations.
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3is di¢ cult and controversial. In practice central banks may still prefer to
choose in￿ ation as their target.
Therefore, this paper suggests that the policy implications of a model
with input output connections is in line with the practice of many in￿ ation
targeting central banks, that pay close attention to "CPI in￿ ation".
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 outlines
the model. Section 4 derives a welfare function for a central bank based
on a representative household￿ s utility function. Section 5 characterizes op-
timal monetary policy. Section 6 looks at the implications of alternative
assumptions regarding the sectoral di⁄erences for optimal monetary policy
design and compares the performance of alternative simple rules. Section 7
summarizes the conclusions.
2 The Model
The model is the same as that in Huang and Liu (2005). The approach of
the model is to incorporate intermediate goods into an otherwise standard
DSGE model with monopolistic competition and no capital accumulation.
The production of consumption goods requires a composite of intermediate
goods and labour as inputs, whereas the production of intermediate goods
requires labour as the only input. The exposition here aims to outline the
basic elements of the model. There are three types of agents in the economy:
￿rms, consumers and the government. First, I describe the behaviour of the
households and the government, which are standard. Then, I describe the
behaviour of the ￿rms. Huang and Liu (2005) provide a detailed discussion of
the underlying assumptions of the model and the derivation of the structural
equations; thus, the presentation here is kept brief.
2.1 Structure of the Economy
There is a continuum of identical and in￿nitely lived households. These
households derive utility form consumption and leisure. They buy a con-
tinuum of di⁄erentiated consumption goods, which they value according to
a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The government conducts monetary policy and
provides production subsidies to eliminate any distortions in the steady state.
The production subsidies are ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes.
5
4The production of consumption goods goes through two stages of process-
ing, from intermediate goods to ￿nished goods. In fact, the production
side of the economy can be thought of as having two sectors: sector m;
in which the intermediate goods are produced and sector f; in which the
￿nal consumption goods are produced. Within each sector or each stage of
processing, there is a continuum of ￿rms. In each sector, the ￿rms have a
monopoly power over a speci￿c product, for which the demand has a con-
stant price elasticity ￿k for k 2 ff;mg. In sector f; ￿rms operate a technology
Yft(j) =
￿￿ Ymt
￿￿ (AftNft(j))
1￿￿ that transforms a composite of intermediate
goods
￿￿ Ymt
￿
, which is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of di⁄erentiated intermediate
goods, and labour (Nft(j)) into output (Yft) subject to productivity shocks
(Aft). In sector m; ￿rms produce intermediate goods which are required to
produce the ￿nal consumption goods. Firms in this sector operate a technol-
ogy Ymt(i) = AmtNmt(i) that transforms labour (Nmt(i)) into output (Ymt(i))
subject to productivity shocks (Amt): The productivity shocks each follows
an AR(1) process with variances of innovations of ￿f and ￿m. Within each
sector, ￿rms set prices according to the Calvo process. Therefore, the opti-
mal price in each sector is an e⁄ective markup (adjusted for subsidy) over a
weighted average of the marginal costs of the future periods, during which
the price is expected to remain in e⁄ect. The mark-up, ￿k; can capture many
possible market structures from standard monopoly
￿
￿k =
￿k
￿k￿1
￿
to perfect
competition (￿k = 1). The degree of competition increases in ￿k. The price
index of the intermediate goods corresponds roughly to PPI, whereas the
price index of the ￿nished goods corresponds to CPI.
2.2 Log-linearized Economy
In this section, I will simply present the log-linearised macroeconomic frame-
work. We de￿ne ~ ct = ct ￿ c￿
t as the gap between actual output, ct and
the ￿ exible-price equilibrium output level c￿
t: The Euler condition from the
representative household￿ s consumption is given by
~ ct = Et~ ct+1 ￿ ￿
￿1(rt ￿ Et￿ft+1 ￿ rr
￿
t) (1)
where ￿ denotes the relative risk aversion in consumption, ￿ft is the
in￿ ation rate in the ￿nished goods sector, rt is the nominal interest rate and
rr￿
t = r￿
t ￿ Et￿￿
ft+1 denotes the real interest rate when prices are ￿ exible. r￿
t
and ￿￿
ft denote the nominal interest rate and the CPI in￿ ation rate when
6
5prices are ￿ exible, respectively.
In each sector, the dynamics of in￿ ation in terms of real marginal cost
is described by an equation analogous to the one associated with a standard
one-sector model:
￿ft = ￿￿ft+1 + ￿f~ vft (2)
￿mt = ￿￿mt+1 + ￿m~ vmt (3)
with
￿k =
(1 ￿ ￿k)(1 ￿ ￿k￿)
￿k
for k 2 ff;mg
where ￿ is the discount rate, ￿ is the cost share of intermediate input in
￿nal goods production, (1 ￿ ￿f) and (1 ￿ ￿m) are the Calvo reset probabili-
ties in the ￿nished good sector and the intermediate good sector, respectively.
~ vft and ~ vmt are the real marginal costs in the ￿nished good sector and in the
intermediate goods sector, respectively, and are given by
~ vft = (1 ￿ ￿)￿~ ct + ￿~ qt (4)
~ vmt = ￿~ ct ￿ ~ qt (5)
where ~ qt = qt ￿ q￿
t is the relative price gap. qt = pmt ￿ pft denotes the
relative price of intermediate goods in units of consumption goods and q￿
t de-
notes the value of this relative price in ￿ exible-price level equilibrium. Note
that it is no longer possible to express the real marginal cost entirely as a
function of the output gap, as in a one-sector economy. In this economy, in
each sector, the real marginal cost depends on the output gap as well as the
relative price gap. High aggregate demand increases the real marginal cost
and that increases in￿ ationary pressure in both sectors. A high relative price
in the intermediate sector reduces the real marginal cost and therefore in￿ a-
tionary pressure in that sector, whereas a high relative price in the ￿nished
good sector increases in￿ ationary pressure in that sector.
The relative price gap is given by
~ qt = ~ qt￿1 + ￿mt ￿ ￿ft ￿ ￿q
￿
t (6)
7
6where ￿q￿
t is given by
￿q
￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿aft ￿ ￿amt) (7)
where ￿akt = akt ￿ akt￿1 is the productivity growth rate in sector k 2
ff;mg:
Finally, the productivity growth rate shocks each follow an AR(1) process.
In particular,
￿akt = ￿k￿akt￿1 + "kt , k 2 ff;mg
where "kt is an idd(0;￿2
k):
3 Welfare Function: Woodford￿ s Approxima-
tion
Huang and Liu (2005) follow the procedure described in Woodford (2003)
and derive a utility based objective function of a central bank, to provide a
benchmark for evaluating the performance of alternative in￿ ation targeting
monetary policy rules. In a model that leads to equilibrium conditions (1)-
(6), Huang and Liu show that the second order approximation to the welfare
of the representative household is given by
Wt = E
1 X
t=0
￿
tUt = ￿
Uc(C)C
2
E
1 X
t=0
￿
tLt + t:i:p + O(kak
3) (8)
where C is the steady state consumption, Uc(C) is the marginal utility of
consumption, t:i:p collects all the terms that are independent of policy and
O(kak3) summarises all terms of the third or higher orders. The normalised
quadratic loss function Lt is given by
Lt =
￿f￿
￿f
~ c
2
t +
￿f￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿f
(￿~ ct ￿ ~ qt)
2 + ￿
2
ft + ￿
￿gap
￿
gap￿
2
mt (9)
where
￿
gap =
￿f
￿m; ￿gap =
￿f
￿m; ￿k =
(1￿￿k)(1￿￿k￿)
￿k for k 2 ff;mg
where ￿k denotes the elasticity of substitution between the di⁄erentiated
goods in sector k 2 ff;mg:
8
7This loss function is similar to that obtained in a standard one-sector
model, in which the central bank only cares about ￿ uctuations in the output
gap and CPI in￿ ation, but involves two additional terms: variances of PPI
in￿ ation and the marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector. In fact, when
￿ = 0, the loss function reduces to the loss function in a standard one-sector
model, as in Woodford(2003, p. 400).
When discussing the weight that should be assigned to PPI in￿ ation,
Huang and Liu emphasised the role of the share of intermediate goods. How-
ever, it is important to note that the weight assigned to the PPI sector in the
loss function depends not only on the share of intermediate goods but also
on the nominal rigidity gap, ￿gap =
￿f
￿m;and the competition gap, ￿
gap =
￿f
￿m.
Thus, the share of intermediate goods, the nominal rigidity gap and the com-
petition gap, taken together, determine how much the central bank should
care about the variability of PPI in￿ ation. Even if one considers the case in
which the share of intermediate goods gives rise to its greatest concern about
￿ uctuations in the PPI sector, i.e. ￿ = 1, this does not necessarily mean
that the central bank should assign signi￿cant weight to the variations in the
PPI in￿ ation. Consider, for example, the extreme case in which prices in
the CPI sector are sticky, whereas prices in the PPI sector can adjust every
period. In this case, for any degree of competition, the weight assigned to
the variations in the PPI sector is zero.
What happens more generally? For any degree of competition, if prices
in the PPI sector adjust more frequently relative to the prices in the CPI
sector, then the variations in the PPI sector become less important, and the
weight assigned to the PPI is smaller, compared to the case in which the
sectors have the same degree of nominal rigidity. Similarly, for any given
degree of nominal rigidity, if the PPI sector is more competitive relative to
the CPI sector, then PPI in￿ ation becomes more important and vice versa.
The bottom line, therefore, is that the share of intermediate goods as
well as the nominal rigidity gap and the competition gap play crucial role
in shaping the central bank￿ s objective. Ignoring any of these factors would
result in an objective function that would not be the appropriate objective of
policy and may lead to the design of welfare maximizing in￿ ation targeting
rules that may not be appropriate for implementation.
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84 Optimal Monetary Policy
In the model, as noted by (Huang and Liu (2005)),the Pareto optimal al-
location cannot be achieved, so long as 0 < ￿ < 1: As the loss function
(equation 9) makes explicit, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal in
this model only if the gaps and the in￿ ation rates are zero in every period,
that is ~ ct = ~ qt = ￿ft = ￿mt = 0 for all t: However, it is impossible to sat-
isfy all these stabilization objectives at the same time and therefore Pareto
optimal allocation is not attainable. This is most easily seen by considering
the case in which ~ ct = ~ qt = 0: When ~ ct = ~ qt = 0;it follows from equations
(2),(3),(4) and (5) that ￿ft = ￿mt = 0: However, equations (6) and (7) imply
that ￿ft ￿ ￿mt = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿aft ￿ ￿amt);which is inconsistent with the re-
quirement that ￿ft = ￿mt = 0 unless the shocks are identical (￿aft ￿ ￿amt).
Given that the ￿rst best allocation cannot be achieved, I employ La-
grangian methods to determine the optimal monetary policy. In particular, I
compute the optimal policy that can be obtained by maximizing the welfare
level de￿ned in (8) subject to the equilibrium conditions (1)- (6). I obtain
the ￿rst order conditions of this problem by di⁄erentiating the Lagrangian
with respect to each of the endogenous variables and setting these conditions
to zero. The ￿rst order conditions are given by
(
￿f
￿f
)￿ft + ￿ft ￿ ￿ft￿1 ￿ ￿qt = 0 (10)
(
￿m
￿m
)￿mt + ￿mt ￿ ￿mt￿1 + ￿qt = 0 (11)
￿~ ct + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿~ ct ￿ ~ qt)￿ ￿ ￿ft (1 ￿ ￿)￿f￿ ￿ ￿mt￿m￿ = 0 (12)
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿~ ct ￿ ~ qt) ￿ ￿ft￿f￿ + ￿mt￿m ￿ ￿qt + ￿qt+1 = 0 (13)
where ￿ft;￿mt and ￿qt denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the
constraints. These ￿rst order conditions hold for each date t > 1: They also
hold at time zero, if one substitutes the values
￿q;￿1 = ￿f;￿1 = ￿m;￿1 = 0 (14)
These conditions at time zero simply re￿ ect the fact that in period zero there
is no previous policy commitment that the central bank needs to take into
account. Given that each of these ￿rst-order conditions hold at each period
10
9t; they should also hold under commitment4.
I then use central bank￿ s ￿rst order conditions along with the equilibrium
conditions for the model to solve and calculate the level of welfare under
optimal monetary policy.
While this is a useful reference to evaluate the performance of alternative
simple rules, as discussed in Huang and Liu (2005), it is di¢ cult to imple-
ment, as it requires the knowledge of leads and lags of the in￿ ation rates and
the output gap.
5 Monetary Policy Rules
I consider the performance of simple rules with coe¢ cients chosen to max-
imize welfare function in equation (8). I examine the performance of alter-
native in￿ ation targeting rules under which the interest rate reacts to the
lagged interest rate, the CPI in￿ ation as well as PPI in￿ ation. In particular,
I consider an in￿ ation targeting rule with the following form:
rt = arrt￿1 + a￿f￿ft + a￿m￿mt (15)
I also examine the performance of simple rules under which the policy instru-
ment rt targets the output gap. In this case, the interest rate rule is given
by
rt = arrt￿1 + ay~ ct (16)
In a two-sector model, Woodford(2003, p. 441-442) shows that strict target-
ing of the output gap gives welfare outcome nearly identical to that under an
optimal policy. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether Woodford￿ s
conclusion holds in a model that features input-output connections between
the CPI sector and the PPI sector.
4However, as is well-known(e.g. Woodford (2003), p. 473, Wolman (2001) p. 41),
this policy is not time-consistent. This is true because if the central bank were allowed to
reoptimize in period t > 0 to determine the optimal policy commitment from that period
onward, the policy chosen would be di⁄erent from the policy selected in period t = 0.
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106 Choice of Parameters and Computation
I begin with a calibration of the parameters indicating the degrees of nominal
rigidity in the PPI sector, ￿m and the CPI sectors ￿f: Huang and Liu (2005)
assume that the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is the same. In
particular, they set ￿m = ￿f = 0:75: However, this assumption is inconsistent
with recent microeconomic evidence provided by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2007a).
Nakamura and Steinsson (2007a) present evidence on the proportion of
prices that change in a month for consumer prices across categories and for
the intermediate goods across categories of the US economy5. The ￿nd-
ings reported there suggest that in the U.S. economy, intermediate goods
prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices. Nakamura and Steinsson
(2007a) note that there is a large amount of heterogeneity across categories
both in consumer prices and in the intermediate goods prices and emphasize
the median frequency of price changes when summarizing the empirical dis-
tribution of price change frequencies. In particular, they ￿nd that the median
frequency of price changes for consumer prices is 8:7% per month, whereas
the corresponding ￿gure for intermediate goods prices is 13:3%6. Following
Bils and Klenow (2004), I interpret this statistic as a Calvo reset probability.
I convert these monthly ￿gures to quarterly ￿gures and use them to calibrate
the model for the U.S. economy. I assume that ￿f = 0:73 and ￿m = 0:60:
The other two important parameters to calibrate are ￿m and ￿f;which
measure the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated goods at the
two stage of processing. Given the scarcity of disaggregated evidence on
these two parameters, following Huang and Liu, I proceed by calibrating ￿m
= ￿f = 10; which corresponds to a steady state markup of 11%. I will then
assess the policy and welfare implications of alternative combinations of these
parameters.
The rest of the parameter values are taken from Huang and Liu (2005). In
5For the US, there is no "entire PPI index". The PPI is represented in a three stage-of-
process format (￿nished goods, intermediate goods and crude materials). These are three
separate indexes and are not combined into an aggregate index. See http://www.bls.gov
for a full discussion.
6Note that these numbers exclude sales. This is the approach taken by Golosov and
Lucas (2007) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2007b). As Golosov and Lucas (2007) notes
when discussing whether sales should be excluded, "To obtain a good match between the-
ory and data, then, sales must either be removed from the data or added to the model...we
took the ￿rst course"
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11particular, I assume that the cost-share of intermediate goods in ￿nal goods
production to ￿ = 0:6: I use a discount factor ￿ of 0:99 which corresponds to
the annual real interest rate in the steady state of 4%. I assume that ! = 0;
which implies that the representative household￿ s utility is linear in labour
hours. Finally, I set ￿k = 0:95 and the standard deviations of innovations to
productivity shocks ￿k to 0:02.
6.1 Computation
I use Dynare to solve the model (see Juillard (1996)). To compute the optimal
weights in the optimal in￿ ation index, I numerically minimize the welfare loss
with respect to the parameters in the monetary policy rule, a￿coe¢ cients;
subject to the equilibrium conditions ((1)- (6)). To do so, I use the optimiza-
tion routine "fminsearch" in Matlab 7.
Note that there is a slight error in Huang and Liu￿ s Matlab code. In
their Matlab code, when they de￿ne the inverses of ￿f and ￿m;they miss
a pair of parentheses. In e⁄ect, the inverses of ￿f and ￿m are de￿ned as
dHL
f = 1
￿f =
￿f(1￿￿f)
(1￿￿￿f) , dHL
m = 1
￿m =
￿m(1￿￿￿m)
(1￿￿￿m) . The correct de￿nitions are
df = 1
￿f =
￿f
(1￿￿￿f)(1￿￿f), df = 1
￿m = ￿m
(1￿￿￿m)(1￿￿m): As discussed in section
3, the price dispersion in each sector in sector k 2 ff;mg depends on the dk:
Huang and Liu (2005) set ￿f = ￿m = 0:75: When ￿f = ￿m = 0:75; dHL
k < dk:
Therefore, the degree of price dispersion in each sector is underestimated in
Huang and Liu (2005).
7 Results
The aim of this section is to investigate the e⁄ects of the asymmetries between
the CPI sector and the PPI sector in optimal monetary policy design. As
discussed above, I will ￿rst consider the performance of in￿ ation-targeting
rules and will then consider the case in which the central bank targets the
output gap. Throughout the paper, welfare levels (W) are expressed in terms
of the equivalent percentage decline in steady state consumption, which can
be obtained by dividing W by UcC (and multiplied by 100).
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127.1 In￿ ation Targeting Rules
In this subsection, I examine the performance of the in￿ ation-targeting rules
with coe¢ cients chosen to maximise welfare in the model. The main goal
of this section is to investigate the relationship between the optimal policy
parameters a￿f and a￿m; and the di⁄erence in the degree of nominal rigidity
between the sectors, as well as the di⁄erence in the degree of competition.
However, before presenting my main results by using the chosen parame-
ter values for ￿m; ￿f, ￿m and ￿f; it is useful to discuss possible e⁄ects of
structural asymmetry on optimal monetary policy design.
7.1.1 The Implications of Di⁄erent Degree of Nominal Rigidity
I begin by looking at the implications of di⁄erent degrees of nominal rigidity.
I let the value of the of Calvo-PPI parameter, ￿m; vary from 0:75 to 0. For
the sake of comparison, I set the value of the Calvo CPI-sector parameter,
￿f ,to be 0:75; which is the value of ￿f assumed by Huang and Liu, with
the other parameters held at baseline values. For each case, I optimise the
coe¢ cients of the hybrid rule to maximise welfare in the model, then use the
optimised coe¢ cients, construct an optimal in￿ ation index and calculate the
weight that the PPI in￿ ation receives in such an index. The optimal weight
that the PPI sector receives is given by a￿m=
￿
a￿f + a￿m
￿
:
The welfare levels under the hybrid rule and the optimal policy are re-
ported in Figure 1. Figure 2 reports the optimal weight, which the PPI sector
receives in the optimal index. As Figure 1 shows, the hybrid rule performs
very well and gives a welfare outcome close to the optimum. However, the
net bene￿t of switching to the hybrid rule depends on the degree of nom-
inal rigidity in the PPI sector. For example, when the degree of nominal
rigidity between the sectors is the same, then the optimal CPI rule incurs
a welfare loss of 4%; which is about 1:6 times the loss under the optimal
policy7. However, as the ￿gure shows, the net gain of using the hybrid rule
falls dramatically as the PPI sector becomes more ￿ exible. The question
7The scale of welfare losses is in line with that of in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba
(2006). However, the scale is di⁄erent from that of in Huang and Liu. For example, when
the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is the same, the ￿ndings reported in
Huang and Liu suggest that the CPI rule incurs a welfare loss of 0.25%. The di⁄erence in
scale arises due to the fact that, for the reasons discussed earlier, the price dispersion in
each sector is underestimated in Huang and Liu.
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13then arises: how does the optimal weight of the PPI sector changes as the
relative frequency between the sectors change? Five points should be made:
First, as evident from Figure 2, the optimal weight of the PPI sector is
highly sensitive to the Calvo parameter in that sector and decreases as the
PPI sector adjusts more frequently relative to the consumer prices. This
result is closely related to the ￿ndings of Benigno (2004), Mankiw and Reis
(2003) and Woodford (2003).
Second, if the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is the same,
which corresponds to the case studied by Huang and Liu, the target weight
that the PPI sector receives is as high as 38%: Note that this number is
lower than the value reported by Huang and Liu. The corresponding value
in Huang and Liu is 46%. The di⁄erence from Huang and Liu seems to arise
from the error described above.
Third, small di⁄erences in the relative frequency can lead to signi￿cant
decreases in the optimal PPI weight. For example, if the relative frequency
between the sectors is only 10%, then the optimal weight should be reduced
by 15%, passing from 0:38 to 0:33.
Finally, if the PPI sector has fully ￿ exible prices, then the optimal weight
that the PPI sector receives in the optimal index is zero, which is in line with
the ￿ndings of Aoki (2001).
The main reason for these results is that, as discussed earlier, the central
bank should also care about variations in PPI in￿ ation. The reason why PPI
in￿ ation enters the loss function is that the production of intermediate goods
requires labour as an input. The demand for labour input (~ nmt) in this sector
is given by
~ nmt= ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ~ qt+(1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)~ ct+
Z 1
0
￿
Pft(i)
Pt
￿￿￿
di+
Z 1
0
￿
Pmt(i)
Pt
￿￿￿
di
(17)
The demand for labour input in the PPI sector depends on the price disper-
sion
￿
R 1
0
￿
Pmt(i)
Pt
￿￿￿
di
￿
caused by sticky prices in that sector. It is through
this channel that PPI in￿ ation turns out to be relevant for welfare. Indeed,
as discussed above, the weight assigned to PPI in￿ ation in the loss function
decreases as the degree of nominal rigidity in that sector decreases. As a
result, variations in PPI in￿ ation becomes less important as the contract
duration decreases and, therefore, PPI in￿ ation receives less weight in the
15
14optimal in￿ ation index as the contract duration decreases. In addition to
this, the in￿ ation process in the CPI sector is in￿ uenced by the price level in
the PPI sector. This can be seen easily by rewriting the real marginal cost
in the CPI sector in nominal terms. Using equations (4) and (5), one can
clearly show that marginal cost in the CPI sector is related to the price level
in the PPI sector (pmt) by
vft = ￿~ ct + ￿pmt + (1 ￿ ￿)pft ￿ ￿q
￿
t (18)
Thus, there is a spillover e⁄ect from the PPI sector to the CPI sector via
the marginal cost. As a result, ignoring ￿ uctuations in PPI in￿ ation would
be even more disruptive. A policy rule that stabilises ￿ uctuations in PPI
in￿ ation would also minimise the disruptive e⁄ect of the PPI sector on the
CPI sector.
It is important to note that the results are also related to the ￿nding
obtained in a model with sticky prices and sticky wages, such as Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000) in which it is argued that optimal monetary
policy can be closely approximated by targeting nominal wages. As noted
by Huang and Liu, the main di⁄erence between this model and that of Erceg
et al. (2000) is that in Erceg et al. (2000) the primary input is labour rather
than intermediate goods. However, this di⁄erence has important implications
on monetary policy design. This is because the nominal rigidity of labour
contracts is of a di⁄erent nature from the nominal rigidity of intermediate
goods. If we think of labour as the primary input, the degree of nominal
rigidity would probably be much higher than that for intermediate goods.
Therefore, as the ￿ndings above suggest, if I were to assume that the primary
input is labour, then the optimal weight of this sector would have been large.
7.1.2 An Application to U.S. Data
I have thus far established the intuitions on the mechanism through which
sectoral asymmetries can a⁄ect the policymaker￿ s objective function and the
optimal weights that the sectors receive in the optimal in￿ ation index. The
￿ndings in the previous section explicitly show that di⁄erences in the nominal
rigidity between the PPI sector and the CPI sector have signi￿cant impli-
cations on the design of an optimal monetary policy. The question is then:
how much weight should the central banks assign to the PPI and the CPI in
reality?
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15Table 1 provides an answer by applying the model to frequencies of price
adjustment for the U.S. economy. Reported here is the target weight of
the PPI in￿ ation in the optimal in￿ ation index and the relative degree of
stickiness between the sectors.
My conclusion is evident: once the empirically relevant contract lengths
for each sector are used to calibrate the model, the PPI in￿ ation indeed
receives a positive target weight, but the weight is much less than in the
case where it is assumed that both sectors have the same degree of nominal
rigidity In particular, the target weight on the PPI sector is around 18%,
roughly half of what it is under a symmetric degree of nominal rigidity.8 9
7.1.3 Degree of Nominal Rigidity Uncertainty
How important is the ￿nding in the previous section? In order to understand
the importance of this ￿nding I consider the case in which the central bank
formulates its policy by assuming, incorrectly, that sectors are identical in
terms of degree of nominal rigidity, when in fact they are not. As empirical
evidence surveyed in section 1 reveals, the PPI sector adjusts more frequently
than the CPI sector. I then compute the welfare loss under such a policy
rule in the true economy.
Table 2 reports the welfare losses under the policymaker￿ s misperceptions
about the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors. The table indicates
that if the PPI sector is more ￿ exible than the CPI sector in the true economy,
then formulating monetary policy based on the incorrect assumption that
the sectors are the same in terms of their contract length would lead to
substantial welfare losses.
How robust is this rule which gives substantial weight to the CPI in￿ a-
tion? To assess the robustness of this rule, I consider the case in which the
policymaker optimises the parameters of the policy rule based on the as-
sumptions that in the PPI sector the prices adjust more frequently than the
prices in the CPI sector. However, in the true economy it turns out that the
8I have also used the mean frequencies of adjustment to calibrate the model. Using
the mean, instead of the median, does not change the results signi￿cantly. In the case of
the mean, ￿f = 0:37 and ￿m = 0:2 and the optimal PPI weight is 17%.
9I have also calibrated the model for the Euro-Area by using the mean frequencies
of adjustment. Unfortunately, the median frequencies of adjustment are not available
for the Euro-Area. Calibrating the model for the Euro-Area does not change the results
signi￿cantly. In the case of the Euro-Area, ￿f = 0:55, ￿m = 0:34 and the optimal PPI
weight is around 15%.
17
16degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is the same. I again compute
the welfare loss under such a policy rule in the true economy.
As Table 2 shows, employing a rule that is optimised under the assump-
tion that the prices in the PPI sector adjust more frequently within a model
that assumes the same degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors results
in a welfare loss. This level of loss is much less than the case in which the
monetary policy is formulated by assuming the same degree of nominal rigid-
ity. More speci￿cally, the increase in the value of loss is roughly half of that
under the previous case.
Table 3 shows the reasons for this result. Reported in the table are the
standard deviations of the output gap, CPI in￿ ation and PPI in￿ ation under
central bank￿ s misperceptions about nominal rigidities. Consider ￿rst the
case in which the central bank formulates its policy by assuming that prices in
the PPI sector adjusts more frequently than prices in the CPI sector, whereas
in the true economy the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is
the same. As noted above, in this case, the target weight on PPI in￿ ation
is around 18%, whereas the corresponding number in the true economy is
around 38%. Not surprisingly, increased target weight on CPI in￿ ation leads
to lower CPI in￿ ation variability but that comes at the cost of greater PPI
in￿ ation and output gap variability. On the other hand, if the central bank,
when formulating its policy, overestimates the degree of nominal rigidity in
the PPI sector, then the more aggressive response to PPI in￿ ation leads
to lower PPI in￿ ation variability; however, that then leads to greater CPI
in￿ ation and output gap variability. The increase in CPI in￿ ation volatility
is more costly in the latter case, since the rise in CPI in￿ ation volatility has
more weight in the loss function. Thus, overestimating the degree nominal
rigidity in the PPI sector leads to a larger deterioration in social welfare.
7.1.4 Degree of Competition Uncertainty
Evidence concerning the degree of competition between the PPI sector and
the CPI sector is scarce. It should be noted that there are some studies
that argue that the frequency of price adjustment increases with market
concentration (e.g. Carlton (1986) and Powers and Powers (2001)). However,
a recent study, Bils and Klenow (2004) ￿nds that market power, as measured
by market concentration, is not an accurate predictor of the frequency of
price changes. Given this uncertainty, when examining the implications of
the relative degree of nominal rigidity on optimal monetary policy, I follow
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17Huang and Liu to assume that the degree of competition between the sectors
is the same. Speci￿cally, I set ￿m = ￿f = 10: However, before drawing
any ￿rm policy conclusions, it is essential to check the sensitivity of policy
conclusions to alternative assumptions regarding the degree of competition
between the sectors. As pointed out by Lombardo (2006), when constructing
an in￿ ation index for a central bank to target in a two sector model, the
di⁄erences in the degree of competition between the sectors can a⁄ect policy
conclusions. I now consider the situations in which the degree of competition
between the sectors di⁄ers.
Figure 3 performs the same exercise as in Table 1 but with alternative
assumptions regarding the relative degree of competition between the sectors.
As expected, allowing for di⁄erent degrees of competition between the sectors
e⁄ects the optimal weights. The optimal weight on PPI decreases as the
competition gap, ￿
gap =
￿f
￿m; increases and vice versa. However, it should
be noted that the e⁄ect is small expect in cases where there is a signi￿cant
di⁄erence in the degree of competition between sectors. The reason for these
results is that price dispersions caused by sticky prices in sector k 2 ff;mg
increases ￿k due to the assumed Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The higher the
￿k (i.e. the goods are more substitutable); as the price dispersion in the PPI
sector increases, the more disruptive it becomes. Therefore, the target weight
of the PPI sector increases with increases in ￿k:
Given this ￿nding, a question arises: how should a central bank con-
cerned with protecting against error act when there is uncertainty regarding
the degree of competition? To answer this, I investigate the consequences
of employing an incorrect combination of values for the parameters which
characterise the degrees of competition in the sectors by using the notion
of fault tolerance introduced by Levin and Williams (2003). More speci￿-
cally, I consider variations in ￿
P
m, from 2 to 20, which denotes the central
bank￿ s perceived value of ￿m;while ￿f and the other parameters are held at
the baseline values. For a given value of ￿
P
m; I let the central bank ￿nd the
optimal coe¢ cients in the policy rule based on ￿
P
m, which may di⁄er from ￿m;
the parameter that characterises the actual degree of competition in the PPI
sector. I then compute the welfare loss under such a policy rule with ￿m
10.
Figure 4 plots the welfare losses under misperceived degree of competition
10The exercise is similar to the previous study by Walsh (2005) in assessing the con-
sequences of formulating monetary policy under possible misperceptions of the model
parameters.
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18(￿
p
m) relative to that under correct degree of competition (￿m). The ￿gure
shows that the central bank can avoid most of the losses due to competition
uncertainty by assuming that the degree of competition in the PPI sector is
lower than the CPI sector. In other words, underestimating ￿
P
m appears to
lead to a more robust policy. Here, a min-max strategy would set ￿
P
m = 6,
which implies that the target weight of the PPI sector is 12%: When ￿
P
m = 6;
the average loss is never more than 20% worse than the loss under the correct
degree of competition. Note that when ￿
P
m = 2; which implies that the target
weight of the PPI is 4%, the average loss is no more than 33% worse than
the loss under the correct degree of competition; whereas, when ￿
P
m = 20;
the target weight of the PPI is 30% and the average loss can be more than
270% than the loss under the correct degree of competition.
Thus, a policy rule that does not completely ignore PPI in￿ ation but gives
substantial weight to CPI in￿ ation exhibits much greater fault tolerances. In
contrast, a policy that gives substantial weight to both CPI in￿ ation and
PPI in￿ ation can lead to substantial welfare losses.
7.2 Output Gap Targeting
I now consider the performance of the output gap targeting rule. Figure 5a
plots the welfare level under the optimal policy and the output gap targeting
when ￿m varies from 0 to 1, while ￿xing the other parameters at the baseline
values. Figure 5b performs the same exercise, as in Figure 5a, but it considers
variations in ￿m:
As evident from the ￿gures, a simple rule under which the central bank
responds to the output gap yields a welfare outcome nearly identical to the
optimal policy regardless of the relative frequency of price adjustment and of
competition: The reason for this result can be easily seen by simply summing
the in￿ ation equations for sectors f and m, which gives
￿
a
t = ￿￿
a
t+1 + ￿~ ct (19)
where
￿
a
t =
1
￿f
￿ft + ￿
1
￿m
￿mt
It follows from this equation that a policy that targets the output gap can
also eliminate ￿ uctuations in ￿a
t; which suggests that output gap stabilization
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19is equivalent to stabilization of in￿ ation in this model:
Given this ￿nding, it can also be concluded that any simple rule (e.g.
optimal Taylor rule) under which the coe¢ cients are optimally chosen and
includes the output gap as a targeting variable would yield a welfare outcome
that is close to optimum. This result contradicts with the ￿nding of Huang
and Liu (2005), who argued that the incorporation of the output gap as an
additional targeting variable does not a⁄ect welfare results. The di⁄erence
from Huang and Liu seems to arise from the error in Huang and Liu (2005).
Although strictly targeting of the output gap gives outcome close to op-
timum, as has been pointed out by various authors (see for example Erceg
and Levin (2005), Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005), Wood-
ford (2003)), this type of rule is not operational in the sense of McCallum
(1999). That is, this type of rule is demanding concerning the knowledge of
the economy. In particular, it requires measurement of the natural rate of
output in the economy. However, measurement of the natural rate of output
and,therefore, of the output gap is di¢ cult and controversial. Therefore, in
practice central banks may still prefer to choose in￿ ation as their target.
8 Summary and Conclusions
I have shown that in a model which features input-output connections be-
tween sectors such that a distinction between CPI and PPI arises from the
model, a welfare maximizing central bank should use an optimal in￿ ation in-
dex that gives substantial weight to CPI in￿ ation. For those familiar with the
conclusion of Huang and Liu (2005), this result should be surprising. They
argue that the "optimal in￿ ation index" should place substantial weight on
both CPI in￿ ation and PPI in￿ ation.
The main di⁄erence is in our assumptions regarding the degree of nominal
rigidity between sectors. Huang and Liu, in arriving at their conclusion,
incorrectly assume that the degree of nominal rigidity between the sectors is
the same, when in fact it is not. Microevidence suggests that producer prices
adjust more frequently than consumer prices. The degree of nominal rigidity
between sectors plays an important role in determining the weights assigned
to sectors. The weight on PPI in￿ ation is small if prices in this sector are
more ￿ exible, as the prices can adjust more frequently and the disruptive
e⁄ect of PPI in￿ ation in the economy is small. I apply the model to the U.S.
economy and ￿nd that the optimal PPI weight is approximately 18%.
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20The degree of competition between sectors can also a⁄ect the optimal
weights assigned to sectors. Holding other factors constant, increased com-
petition in the PPI sector increases the target weight of the PPI sector.
However, the degree of competition between di⁄erent sectors is an issue of
great uncertainty. I examine how monetary policy should be formulated
when the central bank faces uncertainty regarding the degree of competition
uncertainty. The results suggest that a central bank concerned with protect-
ing itself against errors should assume that a lower degree of competition in
the PPI sector compared to the CPI sector. In this case, the optimal PPI
weight is around 12%.
These ￿ndings suggest that central banks should use an optimal in￿ ation
index that puts large weight on CPI in￿ ation. In fact, a variety of com-
parisons indicate that if central banks use the in￿ ation index that assigns
substantial weight to stabilizing both CPI and PPI, then the welfare loss
would be large.
Finally, it may be useful to note that the strict output targeting rules
perform very well in this model and give a welfare level close to the optimum.
However, it is well known that this type of rule is not easy to implement, as
this rule requires measurements of the natural rate of output in the economy,
which is di¢ cult and controversial. Therefore, a rule targeting in￿ ation that
mainly focuses on CPI in￿ ation represents a sensible approach to policy.
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241￿￿m
1￿￿f The optimal weight of PPI in￿ ation
The U.S. Economy 1.52 0.18
Table 1: The optimal weight of PPI in￿ ation with empirically relevant fre-
quencies
Actual rigidities Perceived rigidities
￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:60 ￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:73
￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:60 1.00 1.28
￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:73 1.18 1.00
Table 2: Welfare Losses when the central bank misperceives the relative
degree of nominal rigidity between sectors
Actual rigidities Perceived rigidities
￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:60 ￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:73
~ ct ￿ft ￿mt ~ ct ￿ft ￿mt
￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:60 0:03 0:65 2:95 0:65 1:36 2:21
￿f = 0:73;￿m = 0:73 0:82 0:65 2:94 0:05 1:36 2:21
Table 3: Standard deviations(%) when the central bank misperceives the
relative degree of nominal rigidity between sectors
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Figure 1: Welfare losses under alternative in￿ ation targeting regimes for
di⁄erent degrees of nominal rigidity in producer prices (￿f = 0:75): percent
of steady state consumption.
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Figure 2: The weight on PPI in￿ ation in the optimal in￿ ation index for
di⁄erent degrees of nominal rigidity in producer prices (￿f = 0:75):
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Figure 3: The weight on PPI in￿ ation in the optimal in￿ ation index for
di⁄erent degrees of competition in producer prices (￿f = 10).
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Figure 4: The welfare losses under misperceived degree of competition (￿
p
m)
relative to that under correct degree of competition (￿m)
30
290.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0
0.5
1
1.5
a
m
(a)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
1
2
3
q
m
(b)
Output gap targeting
Optimal Policy
Figure 5: (a). welfare losses under output gap targeting for di⁄erent degrees
of nominal rigidity in producer prices: percent of steady state consumption.
(b). welfare losses under output gap targeting for di⁄erent degrees of com-
petition in producer prices: percent of steady state consumption.
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